MiLAT’s TT$41.6 Million Question: What Is a Second Chance Worth?
MiLAT’s TT$41.6 million price tag has reignited the debate over its value. This opinion examines graduate success stories, military structure and the case for measuring a second chance beyond full certification.

Opinion | TriniLulz
A young man should not have to reach a police station before the State decides he is worth the effort.
That is the principle missing from an argument which treats MiLAT’s price tag as though the number, by itself, settles the programme’s value. Trinidad and Tobago must account for public money. It must also account for the opportunities it gives young people who need another route into education, employment and a life with direction.
My view is that spending TT$41.6 million over three years on that work is defensible. An intensive second chance deserves serious investment. Whether every dollar was well spent requires a fuller assessment than a headline pass rate.
The crime fight starts long before a roadblock. It also starts with the next young person a gang might try to recruit—and whether someone offering a better future gets there first.
What Rasheed said—and the questions it leaves
According to TTT’s September 25 report, Senator Daniel Rasheed said the State spent TT$41.6 million on MiLAT over three years, with approximately 300 young people enrolled and an average pass rate of 37.6%. The report connects his criticism to the proportion achieving full certification.
Rasheed also raised participant-welfare concerns. He described the suspension as a pause for reform, with the Government seeking recognised qualifications, employable skills and measurable results. That explanation belongs in this discussion. Student safety cannot be brushed aside because graduates have positive stories to tell.
But the published account does not provide the cohort breakdown, the precise certification threshold or how the average was calculated. We need those details before treating 37.6% as a complete verdict.
Someone who leaves with fewer than a full set of qualifications may still have gained subjects, literacy, confidence and a route into further training. Those gains need measuring. They cannot simply be assumed away.
What MiLAT’s money is supposed to buy
The Military-Led Academic Training programme is described on its official website as a two-year residential programme. Its model combines academic instruction with military structure, mentorship and personal development. Defence Force personnel work alongside civilian professionals.
Its published provision includes remedial reading, conventional school subjects and practical activities such as community service. Readers can explore the programme’s explanation of its educational and developmental purpose for a clearer sense of what it was designed to provide.
That matters when discussing cost. A residential intervention involves a different commitment from paying for a few examination classes. The intended service includes an organised daily routine, adult supervision and sustained support for young men whose earlier schooling did not deliver the qualifications they needed.
Military discipline can contribute to that structure. So can a civilian teacher who notices a learning difficulty and stays with a student until the lesson makes sense. A useful assessment must recognise both.
On Rasheed’s figures, TT$41.6 million averages approximately TT$13.87 million a year. His roughly TT$140,000 per-person calculation spreads the total across the reported enrolment. It should not be presented as an annual cost per student without knowing how the two-year cohorts and enrolment counts overlap.
The proper question is what support was delivered, to whom, for how long and with what lasting results. A large number spoken from a platform cannot answer all of that.
Christian Chandree: from no subjects to six passes
Christian Chandree’s story gives this debate a human starting point. In a September 2024 Guardian profile, the young man from Four Roads, Tamana, described entering MiLAT without CSEC passes and subsequently obtaining six: two Grade I and four Grade II results.
He credited his teachers, Defence Force staff and fellow cadets. He also made clear that he had joined voluntarily to advance himself. He had not been forced into the programme because of misconduct.
The report recorded 43 of 85 examination candidates earning at least five passes. That is one cohort and one measure; it should not be used to declare Rasheed’s differently described average false. It does, however, demonstrate why the public needs the underlying results, not just a single percentage.
Chandree’s experience also challenges the lazy assumption that an institution for at-risk youth is necessarily an institution for criminals. Sometimes the young man needs another chance to learn, and the determination he already possesses needs somewhere productive to go.
Akeel Timothy: a second chance carried into business
A July 2026 Guardian report described Akeel Timothy as a Diego Martin entrepreneur operating transport, car-rental and courier businesses. His route there included MiLAT.
Timothy said he entered with one CSEC pass and graduated in 2017 with six overall, gaining five additional subjects during the programme. He remembered a teacher returning to an English assignment he had abandoned and working through it with him. He eventually earned a Grade I in English.
He also said his intake later produced more than 20 soldiers and sailors, alongside entrepreneurs and other professionals. That is his account of his cohort, rather than an independently verified graduate tally, and it should be presented as such.
Still, the educational gain and later business activity described in his profile are precisely the kinds of outcomes a serious evaluation should follow. The value of a programme can continue after the graduation ceremony. A qualification matters more when it becomes a foundation for something a young person can sustain.
The successes extend beyond one examination slip
There are other documented examples. In Parliament in October 2017, Glenda Jennings-Smith reported that MiLAT’s July graduating group contained 62 young men. She said 40% obtained five or more subjects and 80% obtained at least three, and described former participants entering the Defence Force and a sports scholarship. These were government-reported results at that time.
Newsday’s September 2025 account of MiLAT’s debating competition captured another form of progress. Cadets Michael Joseph and D’Angelo Seyjagat spoke about developing confidence and public-speaking ability through preparation and competition.
Those skills have value in a job interview, a classroom and everyday working life. They do not replace qualifications. They help a young person use the qualifications and opportunities he obtains.
The Government has itself recognised a broader set of outcomes. Its Social Sector Investment Programme 2025 reported positive social development, attitudes to learning, discipline, deportment and conduct among 90% of cadets during the October 2023–June 2024 reporting period.
That was programme reporting, not independent proof of a 90% success rate. The assessment method needs scrutiny. But it raises a fair question: if those developmental outcomes were worth recording, why should the public now assess value solely through full certification?
These examples establish that young people have described and demonstrated meaningful progress. They do not establish what happened to every participant, or how many crimes MiLAT prevented. Both statements can be true.
Prevention begins before the next recruit
Police must protect people facing violence now. Victims need investigations that lead somewhere, and communities need effective law enforcement. Investment in youth development belongs alongside that work.
Consider the young person who has fallen out of school, lacks qualifications and sees no realistic route into paid work. A credible intervention can offer something concrete: a place to learn, adults who expect him to turn up, peers pursuing a goal and a next step he can describe.
That is the prevention argument for MiLAT. It seeks to strengthen the legitimate choices available to young people before a crisis develops. It does not depend on claiming every participant would otherwise join a gang. Indeed, treating every vulnerable young man as a criminal-in-waiting would undermine the respect such programmes should build.
It would also be unfair to judge one small programme by whether the entire country’s crime rate rose or fell. National crime reflects many influences. The useful question is what happened to participants, compared with their starting points and, where a sound evaluation permits, with similar young people receiving other support.
TriniLulz has previously examined why the crime fight must include stopping the next recruit. MiLAT brings that argument down to a practical choice: how do we provide a dependable alternative, and how do we know it is working?
We cannot ask young people to choose a different path while making the available path uncertain.
Demand better evidence and protect the opportunity
Defending the investment means being serious about results. Full certification should remain a clear goal. Students deserve qualifications that employers and training institutions recognise. A low completion or attainment rate should trigger investigation into teaching, admissions, learning needs, staffing and student support.
The public assessment should answer a manageable set of questions:
- What changed academically? Publish entry qualifications, literacy and numeracy levels, subjects gained, completion and full certification by cohort, with clear definitions.
- What happened afterwards? Track further study, employment and training at six, 12 and 24 months, while explaining missing responses and protecting participants’ privacy.
- Were students safe and supported? Report how complaints were investigated, what protection was provided and whether students could raise concerns independently.
- What did the service cost? Separate spending categories and distinguish individual entrants from participant-years, then compare credible alternatives serving similar needs.
MiLAT’s website has advertised a tracer study seeking former cadets’ feedback. Publishing a properly explained account of graduate outcomes would be a useful step. Success stories should help guide the questions; a full evaluation should answer them.
The welfare concerns Rasheed raised require particular attention. A good mission does not excuse unsafe conditions. Where protection requires an immediate pause, that action must be accompanied by safe continuing support and a clear explanation of how affected young people will complete their education.
Government should therefore publish a dated reform or replacement plan: who is responsible, what will change, what it will cost, when places will be available and how current participants will be supported in the meantime. The promise of a second chance needs a timetable.
What is a second chance worth?
There is room to improve MiLAT and still defend the principle behind it. There is room to question spending and still conclude that intensive support for young people merits substantial public money.
The stronger response to disappointing results is to identify what failed, preserve what worked and provide a better service. A suspended programme becomes a policy success only if the young people it was meant to serve end up with something safer and more effective.
For Trinidad and Tobago, the value at stake includes the student who discovers he can pass English, the young man who becomes confident enough to apply for work and the graduate who builds a business. Those are outcomes worth pursuing even when no one can attach an honest figure for crimes prevented.
MiLAT’s TT$41.6 million deserves examination. So does the cost of leaving young people without a credible next step.
What does a second chance cost—and what does giving up cost?
Reporting note: This opinion draws on published reporting, programme information and government documents available on 28 September 2026. Graduate accounts are attributed to the outlets that reported them. TriniLulz did not conduct the original interviews.
This story is part of our wider Trinidad Politics Explained coverage. Explore the full hub for political analysis, key background, major controversies, and the latest updates.






